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CVE-2026-72407: Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner L3 header, geneve_gro_receive()…
CVE-2026-72407 is rated critical with a CVSS v3.1 base score of 10.0. Per its scoring, it can be exploited over the network, without authentication, without any user interaction. The scored impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability is the highest available.
Vulnerability description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete() Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete() re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/ geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed. geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if it lands past inner_network_offset. Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag (vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header, i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.
Severity breakdown
CVSS v3.1 10.0: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack vector: Network. Exploitable remotely over the network, with no need for local or physical access.
- Attack complexity: Low. No special conditions; the attack can be repeated reliably.
- Privileges required: None. No account or prior access is needed.
- User interaction: None. No action from any user is needed.
- Scope: Changed. Impact reaches beyond the vulnerable component to other resources.
- Confidentiality impact: High. Total loss of confidentiality; sensitive data can be fully disclosed.
- Integrity impact: High. Total loss of integrity; data or system state can be fully modified.
- Availability impact: High. Total loss of availability; the component can be shut down.